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DEDICATION
Self-Deception can be summed up thusly – causing one’s self to see the world
the way we want it to be, rather than the way that it really is. When we lie to ourselves,
we use our hopes and dreams, our memories, and even our prejudices to construct the
vision that we have of the world around us. Self-Deception causes us to take only that
information which strengthens and affirms our world view, and reject that which
opposes it. Sometimes it can even cause us to see those who have a different vision of
the world as “other”, and somehow less than human. This most terrible incarnation of
Self-Deception can even enable groups and individuals to engage in acts of terror upon
their fellow man.
I would like to dedicate my study of Self-Deception to the victims of the act of
terror perpetrated at the Boston Marathon. May our growing understanding of this
complex phenomenon serve to break down the walls that separate us as individuals, and
help us to understand and care for each other more completely. May this knowledge
serve a small part in the effort to end intolerance and the violent hatred of that which is
different. May future generations use what we have learned to develop their own sense
of the deep interconnection between persons both locally and globally, and stomp out
egocentric thinking.
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Abstract
Self-Deception creates a mental state in which an individual unquestioningly
maintains a belief that has clearly been refuted and proven faulty by some information
which the self-deceiver has come to possess. However, aside from personality trait
measures, no measurement techniques have been developed which capture the act of
Self-Deception in a laboratory setting. In order to fill this need, the current research
sought to examine the relationship between self-deception and cognitive dissonance,
and used this relationship to create the Double Standards scale.
In the current research, participants completed several surveys online. They then
came into the lab, where they were be randomly assigned to Affirmed and Deaffirmed
conditions.
It was found that asking participants to recall their past behaviors condom use
caused those participants to significantly lower their estimation of the average person’s
likelihood to use condoms, but not to change their ratings of their own likelihood. It was
also found that Affirmed participants did not lower their ratings of others as much as
participants in the Deaffirmed condition. The implications for these findings are
discussed.
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CHAPTER I
DOUBLE STANDARDS IN SELF-DECEPTION
The act of Self-Deception has fascinated psychologists for many years.
Seemingly, in the pursuit of a descriptive account of this phenomenon, more questions
have been raised than answered. What is Self-Deception? How and why to people
deceive themselves? Is Self-Deception intentional? Interpersonally, the deception of
others requires an individual to hold some specific information while leading another
individual to believe some contradictory information. If Self-Deception is structurally
similar to interpersonal deception, then it seems that the Self-Deceiving person must
intentionally deceive themselves, as well as hold a pair of fundamentally opposed
beliefs. In other words, a deceiver believes x and brings it about that the deceived
believes not-x; since the self-deceiver plays both roles, they must believe both x and
not-x.
According to Davidson (1985), self-deception comes quite naturally to people,
and yet it poses a huge problem for philosophical psychology. Intuitively, it seems that
self-deception would be impossible (Haight, 1980). Deception is the act of one
individual who knows a certain fact deceiving another who does not know that fact, and
thus one person should not be able to deceive themselves because they cannot both
know and not know the same thing. However, it cannot be impossible since we do in
fact deceive ourselves (Gur & Sackheim, 1979).
Empirical research into Self-Deception, however, denies the literal account of
Self-Deception favored by “pure” philosophers. Instead, Self-Deception can be
explained by looking at the egocentrically biasing effects that our desires have on our
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beliefs. A person desiring x can make it easier for themselves to believe x by
influencing the way that he or she gathers and interprets evidence relevant to the truth
of x (Mele, 2001).
The Preservation of the Self
The “self” can be conceptualized as a highly complex system which consists of
multiple structures, both cognitive and evaluative, as well as the regulation of these
structures (Filipp, & Klauer, 1985; James, 1980; Markus, & Wurf, 1987; Mead, 1934;).
The self as a whole, like many systems, is in a constant flux between stability and
change. For the most part, individuals have a sense of being the same person throughout
their entire life, and actually remain so relative to various aspects of themselves. The
entire premise of personality psychology is that we are highly stable in certain central
dimensions (Bengtson, Reedy, & Gordon, 1985). However there is also a pervasive
need to adapt in order to properly develop. Many studies have shown that we adjust the
“self” in response to even minor situational demands (Hannover, Pohlmann, Springer,
& Roeder, 2005). While these adjustments need not be completely accurate, they must
be realistic in order to properly regulate our behaviors (Greve & Wentura, 2003). As
necessary and frequent as these changes are, though, we often experience loss when we
change those things about ourselves that seem to be a major part of who we are (Baltes,
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006). In fact, when we are presented with information
which directly contradicts or attacks our self-image, Self-Deception may be used to
preserve that image.
Because of these constant adjustments to our self-image due to new and
situational information, it is likely that we would integrate information with some
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regularity which would decrease the positive aspect of how we see ourselves. Surbey
(2011) suggests that Self-Deception is a mechanism which allows us to maintain our
self-image by balancing the true with the desirable; she demonstrated empirically that
those who do not engage in self-deception have significantly lower self-esteem than
those who do engage in self-deception.
The Information Processing Bias
The specific ways in which one might deceive one’s self vary, but the common
theme is that information which affirms our held beliefs is preferred over information
that contradicts our held beliefs, or non-affirming information (Mele, 1997). Describing
Self-Deception as having a preference for affirming versus non-affirming information
has an advantage over more literal accounts of Self-Deception, in that literal accounts
require that a person hold “false” information in the conscious mind while holding
“true” information in the unconscious mind (Gur & Sackeim, 1979). It has been
demonstrated experimentally that, contrary to this literal account of Self-Deception,
people can deceive themselves by not processing non-affirming information in the first
place.
In Ditto and Lopez’s (1992) study on preferred versus non-preferred
conclusions, 30 participants were confronted with a judgment situation in which they
had little to no preference for one conclusion over another, and 30 participants did have
a preference for a specific conclusion. This variable of preference was manipulated by
establishing the likeability of two potential candidates for partnership on a task through
evaluations the candidates supposedly filled out about the participants’ performance on
a previous task. In the no preference condition, the candidates “rated” participants
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equally well and fairly highly. In the preference condition, one candidate rated the
participant highly, while the other rated the participant poorly. A second manipulated
variable established the performance of the candidates the participants were to choose
from. In the target positive condition, preferred were rated highly, and the other was
rated poorly, while in the target negative condition, preferred candidates were rated
poorly, while the other was rated highly. In the no preference condition, performance
was randomized. The dependent variable measured how long it took for participants to
judge the performance of the candidates, believing they would work with the one they
deemed most intelligent. It was found that participants required less information to
decide that a dislikeable (non-preferred) candidate was less intelligent (target positive)
than that he was more intelligent (target negative). In other words, participants more
easily made decisions in bias-consistent conditions, compared to bias-inconsistent
conditions.
Self-Deceptive Techniques
Avoiding non-affirming information. One can imagine a variety of situations
when people would avoid further searches for information that would be incompatible
with their goals or desires. For example, some will avoid searching for an alternative
product after already committing to a purchase (Olson & Zanna, 1979), or even avoid
medical testing for a deadly disease due to fear of the possible negative result.
Dawson, Savitsky, and Dunning (2006) examined people’s willingness to
submit to medical testing in a two part study; the first of which measured their
willingness to be tested for a treatable disease, while the second measured their
willingness to be tested for an untreatable disease. Participants in the first study were
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asked to imagine that they were at an elevated risk for a fictitious disease called
Thioamineacetylase (TAA) Enzyme Deficiency. The first variable, severity, was
manipulated by telling one group that the disease involves no adverse symptoms,
whereas the other group was told that TAA deficiency places people at a substantially
elevated risk for severe pancreatic disorders. The second variable, treatability, was
manipulated by telling one group that the deficiency is practically impossible to alter,
and the other was told that they have a great deal of control over their TAA levels. All
participants reported their interest in submitting to a diagnostic test for TAA deficiency
and, using a 2x2 ANOVA, a main effect for severity was revealed. This demonstrated
that participants were more interested in the test when the disorder was described as
severe. However, this was only true in the treatable condition – participants were not
interested in diagnostic testing when the disease was described as untreatable.
In the second part of Dawson et al.’s (2006) study, participants believed
themselves to be facing a choice about a diagnostic test for a real disease called alopecia
areata. The variables were manipulated in the same way as the first part of the
experiment. Those in the high severity condition were told that the disease can
dramatically slow the rate of new hair production, and those who were in the other
condition were not told this. Treatability was manipulated by telling one group that the
condition was not treatable, and the other group was told that it was. All conditions said
they would be willing to undergo formal genetic testing for alopecia areata save for one,
the severe and untreatable condition. The result of the second study demonstrated the
same pattern of responding as the first – That the perception of high consequences in a
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situation where one would have no control to treat the disorder would rather not know if
they have it.
Seeking affirming information. The most obvious case of this type of biased
information search that comes to mind is political. If a person is liberal, they will tend to
watch news channels like MSNBC, whereas a conservative person will tend to watch
FOX News. By selectively choosing one’s sources of information, it is likely that the
bulk of the information they gather will support their existing worldview (Frey, 1986).
Trope and Neter (1994), in two studies, presented participants with immediate
performance outcomes (study 1) or asked them to recall past experiences (study 2). In
both studies, participants in negative feedback and neutral control conditions actively
sought subsequent positive feedback about their abilities, which demonstrates a natural
(or negative response driven) urge to hear information which bolsters self-affirmation.
In the positive feedback condition, participants had already received self-affirming
information, and were significantly more likely to be willing to hear subsequent
feedback about their weaknesses.
In a third study by Trope and Neter (1994), based on the previous two studies, it
was hypothesized that individuals would seek positive experiences when new negative
feedback was made available to them, and that they would do this in order to cope with
the emotional costs of the negative feedback. The experiment consisted of three parts.
In the first, participants performed a personality test and received initial, highly positive
feedback. In the second part of the experiment, allegedly unrelated to the first, subjects
performed an intelligence test and received initial feedback indicating that their overall
score was either excellent, above average, average, or poor. The third part of the
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experiment was a waiting period during which subjects could read positive feedback
from the earlier personality test and engage in a neutral activity (reading magazines) or
some other activity. Three decision conditions were instituted in the waiting period. In
the optional feedback condition, subjects were asked to tell the experimenter at the end
of the waiting period whether they would like to receive detailed feedback about their
intelligence test results. In the mandatory feedback condition, subjects were simply told
that they would receive such feedback at the end of the waiting period. Control subjects
waited for the experiment to continue without expecting detailed feedback regarding the
intelligence test results.
Subjects who were offered new feedback regarding their intelligence spent more
time reading positive personality information than did subjects who were not offered
such feedback. In contrast, when subjects were not given the option of rejecting the
offered feedback, the time they devoted to reading the positive personality feedback
increased with the difficulty of receiving the new feedback, namely, with the negativity
of the new feedback. These results are a demonstration of how individuals try to support
themselves emotionally with self-affirming information, and will do so more with the
threat of receiving information which threatens their worldview.
Taken together, these three studies demonstrate a need for self-affirming
information. This need leads people to seek sources which will affirm their previously
held beliefs, but when their self-affirmation goals have been met, they are more willing
to hear unwelcome information. Therefore, it appears that people are willing to avoid
telling themselves a whole truth by searching for comforting information, but become
more flexible on the matter when they feel secure (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005).
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Selective attention. Obviously, not every situation requires one to seek out
information. Sometimes conflicting opinions and ideas are readily available in our
environment. By selectively attending to preferred aspects of the available information,
however, it is still possible to bias one’s encoding. To return to the example of politics,
a person might find themselves in a group with two distinct divisions in conversation –
one subgroup talking in favor of a socially progressive policy while the other subgroup
is talking against it. Depending on that person’s inherent bias, they can choose to pay
attention to one conversation over the other.
Some of the most direct evidence for selective attention is provided by eye
movement tracking studies. Mood was induced upon two age groups – young adults (18
to 25 yrs.) and older adults (58-89 yrs.) – in a study by Isaazowitz, Toner, Goren, and
Wilson (2008), which demonstrated eye gaze preference between negative and positive
affective stimuli. Mood was induced using the continuous music technique (CMT; Eich
& Metcalfe, 1989), which divided them into positive, neutral, and negative conditions.
Following this task, participants were seated in front of the eye tracker. A 17-point
calibration permitted accurate measurement of gaze. The participants were told that
they would be viewing a slide show and would watch naturally, as if watching
television at home. Overall, participants tended to look away from angry or sad faces,
and toward happy or afraid faces. Younger adults demonstrated mood-congruent gaze –
they preferred happy or neutral faces when in a positive condition, and angry or afraid
faces when in the negative condition. Older adults tended, however to have no
preference when in the positive or neutral condition, but regulated their mood in the
negative condition with a preference for looking at happy faces.
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While there are clear age differences, it is apparent that both groups are
selectively attending for specific emotional states. While younger adults seem to affirm
their current emotional state by attending to congruent stimuli, older adults will selfregulate their negative emotional states by looking toward positive stimuli. In both
cases, the groups are not attending to the overall stimulus, but picking out preferred
information through eye gaze.
Selective skepticism. What happens, though, when despite selectively attending
to preferential information, disagreeable information is encoded into the mind? This
unwelcome information can still be rejected through a biased interpretation of that
which is attitude-inconsistent. For instance, if a person is convinced that the Obama
bailouts were generally positive for the state of the economy, and was presented with
data from a reputable economist that demonstrated the overall effect was a slowdown in
recovery, logic states that this person would probably begin to see how the bailouts
could have been bad. Conversely, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) demonstrated that
selective skepticism can actually lead people to become more polarized in these kinds
of situations.
Dawson, Gilovich, and Regan (2002) argue that people tend to approach
agreeable propositions with a bias toward confirmation and disagreeable position with a
bias toward disconfirmation in a study on motivated reasoning. To divide their
participants into motivational groups, they used the Emotional Lability Inventory (ELI;
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Pinel, Jordan, & Simon, 1993), which is designed to
place nearly all respondents in either a high emotionality or low emotionality category.
Participants in this study were informed of their classification, even though it is
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unambiguous by the wording of the measure, and told that their classification is either
potentially deadly or that the other classification is potentially deadly. Participants who
were told that their classification could be deadly vastly outperformed the other group
on the Wason Selection Task (in which the task rule implied their own early death),
which is designed so that disconfirmation is the best possible strategy. Thus, there is a
clear bias towards disconfirming a highly uncomfortable piece of information,
regardless of its factual basis.
Consequently, because of selective skepticism, people are able to process a
variety of conflicting pieces of information without ever changing their held belief.
With a bias toward disconfirming that which they do not want to believe they are able to
convince themselves that their own viewpoint continues to be supported, regardless of
contradiction.
Manipulated memory. The next progression of deception accepts that a person
may attend to unwanted information, accept it at the time of encoding to memory, but
posits that they might not remember it correctly later. Rather, inconsistent information
could be simply forgotten, or misremembered as either consistent with their held beliefs
or as neutral. Specifically, a person may easily remember all of their victorious chess
matches, but fail to recall the even greater number of losses they incurred when facing
superior players. One may even distort the memory of their failures to overemphasize
external causes for the bad results.
Empirically, this kind of memory bias has been demonstrated in selfimprovement. After taking a study skills class, participants in Conway and Ross’ (1984)
study recalled their previous study skills as being lower than they originally rated then
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before the class. This serves the function of confirming their improvement as a result of
the extra training. Later, they even misremembered course performance as being better
than it actually was to support the false claim of improving.
This same type of self-enhancing recall bias has also been shown related to selfreported alcohol consumption. Gmel and Daeppen (2007) chose men and women who
regularly consumed alcohol from a population of patients in a hospital emergency ward.
They measured alcohol consumption with a seven day diary the patients kept. It was
found that free recall of the amount of alcohol consumed decreased significantly over a
period of seven days as compared to one day after the journal was turned over to the
researchers. This demonstrated that the patients had a desire to reduce the perceived
amount of alcohol they consumed, and improve their self-image.
The Link between Dissonance and Deception
It is clear that self-deception comes in a wide variety of forms in order to
become applicable to a range of situations. On the surface these methods may seem to
be very different, but on closer inspection a commonality begins to emerge. In the
paradigms described above, participants have made an attempt through self-deception to
make themselves appear “better” than they behaved in reality. This desire to live up to
an idealized image, and the discrepancy between it and their actual behavior, has been
described by Elliot Aronson in a different context. He stated that,
“[a]t the very heart of dissonance theory, where it makes
its strongest predictions, we are not dealing with any two
cognitions; rather, we are usually dealing with the selfconcept and some behavior. If dissonance exists, it is
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because the individual’s behavior is inconsistent with his
self-concept.” (Scott-Kakures, 2009).
When people feel self-affirmed, they are typically reminded of the values they
see as important to themselves (e.g., their artistic, humanist, or scientific orientation) or
behaviors of theirs they see as being positive and consistent with their self-image (e.g.,
their kindness to others). By reflecting on their important values or past positive
behaviors, people are reminded that they are moral and efficacious individuals, which
serves to affirm their self-worth. A cornerstone of self-affirmation theory is the idea that
specific attacks on one’s abilities or morals – such as failure on a test – do not need to
be dealt with directly, but rather can be addressed at a more general level by restoring or
reaffirming a global sense of self-worth (Steele, 1988). Thus, self-affirmation makes
people less motivated to defend themselves against a specific attack, as their sense of
self-worth is assured despite the threat posed by the attack.
However, when an individual’s self-image is threatened and they cannot
reaffirm themselves through more global means, two opposing viewpoints are created
which causes dissonance. For example, “I am a good person” may conflict with the
behavior “I purposely insulted that other person for their reckless driving.” In order to
deal with the dissonant situation, a variety of self-deceptive techniques may be used so
that the conflict can be resolved.
Clearly, all of the above mentioned forms of self-deception can be applied to
information which is contradictory to our self-image. But one can imagine an even more
complex form of self-deception in which the self-image is preserved and the conflicting
information is processed and accepted. Similarly to selective skepticism, the double
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standard uses biased reasoning to create two standards for the evaluation of information.
Conversely though, when a double standard is present the information itself is not
evaluated in a biased way. It is the situational rules which become biased in favor of the
self-deceiver. If the individual in the example used a double standard, their solution
may sound something like, “It is wrong to insult people, but that specific person
deserves it because of their own bad behavior.”
The Present Study
Since Anna Freud’s (1936) book about the ego, psychologists have proposed
and studied many different ways that the mind protects itself from information which
would otherwise harm our self-concept, such as denial and repression (Markus & Wurf,
1987), self-serving biases, reappraisal, doubting, and rationalization (Swann & Hill,
1982), and self-immunization by the peripheral adjustment of concepts (Greve &
Wentura, 2003). All forms of “reality negotiation” and reinterpretation entail a certain
degree of deceit (Greve & Wentura, 2010).
According to the pseudo-rationality model of self-deception proposed by Michel
et al. (2010), one particularly salient component of self-deception is ego-centric
standardization (double standard), which is consistent with the above discussion
concerning self-affirmation. Along with an ego-centric bias concerning information,
there are also two standards of evaluation involved: one which is applied to self, and
one which is applied to others (Beauregard, & Dunning, 2001). Based on this, the
pseudo-rationality model is closely related to selective skepticism, as well as the
previous explanation of double standards. The presence of separate standards in self-
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deception has been repeatedly noted in the literature, clearly indicating the use of a
double standard as a unique and specific form of self-deception.
In this work, the author sought to establish an empirical connection between
Self-Deception and the reduction of Cognitive Dissonance. The literature consistently
suggests that a variety of self-deceptive techniques could be used to affirm the selfimage. However, when presented with direct and dissonant self-relevant information, it
seems that the use of a double standard would be most effective to protect the selfimage. This is because the information itself cannot be manipulated, and so the
situational rules surrounding the relevance that the information has for one’s self must
be manipulated instead.
In order to capture this behavior, the author has created a new form of
measurement called the Double Standards scale. To make the connection between
dissonance and Self-Deception clearer, The Double Standards scale uses a similar
framework to one featured in a Cognitive Dissonance study by Stone, Aronson, Crain,
and Winslow (1994). In their study, dissonance was created by having participants
advocate the use of condoms and subsequently reminding them of their own past
failures to use condoms. Those participants who were in the dissonant condition bought
significantly more condoms at the end of the study in order to reduce their dissonance
than participants in any of the three control conditions.
For this study, participants will complete the Double Standards scale. Then, at a
later point in time, they will advocate the use of condoms, reflect on their past condom
use behaviors, and then retake the Double Standards scale. A comparison will be made
between their scores on the scale prior to and after this manipulation.
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It is predicted that participants will not feel that their self-image is under attack
prior to the experimental manipulation, and will rate themselves similarly to the way
they rate others on condom use likelihood. After the manipulation, participants should
experience dissonance as suggested by the Stone (et al., 1994) study. Thus, it is also
predicted that these participants will feel the need to reduce the dissonance and reaffirm
themselves, and will do this by changing their ratings so that their self-ratings are
significantly higher than their ratings of others’ likelihood to use condoms.
If it can be determined that participants significantly lower their ratings of the
average person’s likelihood to use condoms, without lowering their ratings of their own
likelihood, after thinking about their own past behaviors, it will serve as evidence for
the use of a double standard type Self-Deception. This is because both pieces of
information will have to be accepted (condom use is a smart choice/I have failed to use
condoms), and the participant will demonstrate an unrealistic belief, by comparison,
which will be self-affirming.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
Data was collected from volunteers at Eastern Kentucky University. All
volunteers were undergraduate psychology students participating for partial course
credit. The study was designed to have participants complete the Double Standards
scale online via the SONA system, and then come into the lab to complete the
experimental condition later. The initial sample collected online comprised N = 200
participants. They were 27.5% male and 71.5% female, 1% declining to indicate their
sex. 90% of the participants self-identified as White, 3.5% as Black, 1% as Hispanic,
1% as Asian, .5% as Middle Eastern, .5% as Indian, .5% as Guatemalan, 1% as
multiracial, and 2% declined to identify their race. The average age of the participants
was M = 23.69 (SD = 7.18), ranging from 18 to 52 years.
In the experimental condition, the sample was significantly reduced. Only 17
people accepted the invitation to participate in the second part of the study, 8 of which
were randomly assigned to the Affirmed group, and 9 of which were randomly assigned
to the Deaffirmed group. All participants in this condition self-reported as white and
female. The experimental sample had the same approximate age as the initial sample.
Only these participants were included in the experimental analysis.
Materials
The double standards scale. The Double Standards scale asks participants to
evaluate the likelihood of their own use, as well as the average person’s use, of
condoms across 13 situations. Two averages are calculated – the average self-rating and
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the average other-rating. In this study, participants responded using a 6-point scale, a
higher rating indicating a higher likelihood to use condoms. See Appendix A for the
Self-Ratings section, and Appendix B for the Other-Ratings section.
Data collected online indicated that participants rate their own likelihood to use
condoms at about 75.34% (M = 4.52, SD = 1.26, 95% CI = 4.37 – 4.71). The same
participants rated the likelihood of the average person to use condoms at about 75.54%
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.27, 95% CI = 4.35 – 4.71). The internal consistency of both SelfRatings and Other-Ratings was very high. Self-Ratings produced a Cronbach’s alpha of
.923, and Other-Ratings produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .927.
Condom use information sheet. In order to establish and increase the salience
of the “goodness” of using condoms, all participants were given an information sheet
about the benefits of and statistics about condom use in the experimental condition. The
participants were asked to read the information out loud to the researcher. See appendix
C for the specific materials used.
Condom use essay. Two groups were present within the experimental
condition. One group was asked to think about past situations in which they decided
that using condoms was the best choice. They were also asked to write a brief essay
describing the reasoning behind their choices. This group was named the “Affirmed”
condition, as the manipulation was intended to reinforce the participants’ good choices.
See Appendix D for the specific materials used.
The second group was asked to think about past situations in which they decided
that not using condoms was the best choice. They were also asked to write a brief essay
describing the reasoning behind their choices. This group was named the “Deaffirmed”
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condition, as the manipulation was intended to reinforce the participants’ bad choices.
See Appendix E for the specific materials used.
Procedure
It was theoretically important for this research that participants directly
contradict themselves to ensure that we could infer the use of a double standard. Thus,
all participants first completed the Double Standards scale online via the SONA system,
along with providing some basic demographic information. After completing this part
of the study, they were invited to come into the lab for some extra class credit to
participate in the second half. When participants came into the lab, we first had them
read out loud the condom information sheet, and then complete one of the two possible
essays. Participants were randomly assigned to either the Affirmed condition or
Deaffirmed condition. After reading the information sheet and completing their
respective essays, which served as the experimental manipulation for this study, they
again completed the Double Standards scale. After finishing, they were debriefed and
thanked for their time.
Analysis
The design of this study included both within groups and between groups
elements. First, all participants completed the Double Standards scale online, and then
again in the lab after receiving the experimental manipulation. Therefore, it was
necessary to use a test which could accurately compute within groups, or repeated
measures, differences. Second, the experimental manipulation had two levels –
Affirmed and Deaffirmed – which split the experimental condition into two independent
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groups. To encompass all of this variance at once, the variables were entered into a
Repeated Measures General Linear Model (GLM).
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Repeated Measures GLM
Self-ratings. Repeated measures GLM was utilized to simultaneously asses the
within and between groups differences in Self-Ratings on the Double Standards scale.
No significant difference could be established between the initial online condition (M =
4.67) and the experimental condition (M = 4.66, F (1, 15) = 0 .002, p = n.s.). There was
also no significant difference between scores in the Affirmed (M = 4.82) and
Deaffirmed (M = 4.67) groups for Self-Ratings (F (1, 15) = .367. p = n.s.). See Figures
1 and 21.
Other-ratings. Repeated measures GLM was utilized to simultaneously asses
the within and between groups differences in Other-Ratings on the Double Standards
scale. Other-Ratings were found to be significantly higher in the initial online condition
(M = 4.68) than in the experimental condition (M = 3.57, F (1, 15) = 8.944, p < .01, etasquared = .374). The difference between the Affirmed (M = 3.98) and Deaffirmed (M =
3.21) groups approached significance for Other-Ratings (F (1, 15) = 2.115, p = .166,
eta-squared = .124), but could not be officially established as significant. See Figures 1
and 2.

1

All figures listed in Appendix F.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The current research had one main goal. First and foremost, it was the purpose
of this study to establish a theoretical connection between Cognitive Dissonance and
Self-Deception, demonstrating Self-Deception as a unique method of dissonance
reduction. To summarize, Dissonance theory makes its strongest predictions when there
is a disagreement between the self-concept and a specific behavior. More specifically,
dissonance arises when we engage in a behavior that we know is bad, because it is only
natural that we want to believe that we are good.
If Self-Deception can be used to preserve our self-concept, or self-image, by
balancing true information (I engage in bad behavior) with a desirable state (I am a
good person), it logically follows that Self-Deception reduces dissonance. However,
simply stating that Self-Deception balances the true with the desirable does not tell us
exactly how the two are balanced. For the current work, it was proposed that the
egocentric standardization, otherwise known as the double standard, provided the
strongest explanatory model.
In other words, it is possible to maintain one’s belief that a specific behavior is
bad in general, and apply that rule for other people, but still assert another set of rules
for one’s self, thus preserving one’s self-image by making the behavior not bad. This
makes sense theoretically and fits with current literature, but demonstrating this
behavior empirically is difficult. In fact, before this study, it hasn’t been done. The
question then becomes, how does one demonstrate empirically the use of a double
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standard? Furthermore, how does one establish empirically that the double standard is
used as dissonance reduction?
First, it is necessary to observe that the double standard is not being applied
when the self-image is not under attack by dissonance. The results of the analysis in this
study demonstrate the participants rated themselves and the average person with the
same overall likelihood to use condoms. There was no significant difference between
the ratings. Thus, it appears that the participants were applying the same set of rules to
themselves and to others. The assumption being made at this stage is that participants
gauge their estimates of the average use of condoms on their own past behaviors, as
well as their held beliefs about using condoms. Obviously the participants probably
won’t have direct knowledge about the condom use behaviors of others, and so they
must make adjustments from their own behaviors to estimate the average person’s use
of condoms.
Next, the double standard needs to manifest when the self-image is under attack.
In the current work, participants’ self-images were attacked by reminding them
specifically about their past condom use behaviors after asking them to publically state
the dangers of not using condoms. When a double standard is being used, we should see
participants rating themselves just as highly as they did when the self-image was not
under attack. We should also see participants applying the new, adjusted standard to
others.
If participants are estimating the condom use behaviors of others based on their
own behaviors, their ratings of others should be lowered when the participants are
reminded of their own choices to not use condoms in the past. Logically, this reminder
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should cause them to lower their ratings of themselves to the same degree that they
lowered their ratings of others. However, when this reminder is made to feel like an
attack on the self-image by making the dangers of not using condoms more salient,
participants will be motivated to protect their self-image. This can be done by reasoning
that the specific situations in which they decided not to use condoms were unique,
special circumstances. Those situations become the exception and not the rule, and so
the participants are able to maintain that they are good and that their likelihood to use
condoms in general is just as good as it was before they were reminded of these
situations.
This is exactly what we see in the data for this study. There was no significant
difference from the initial Self-Ratings online and the Self-Ratings in the experimental
condition. However, there was a significant decrease in Other-Ratings in the
experimental condition. This effect could only have been caused by reminding the
participants of their own behaviors, and reminding them of the importance of using
condoms.
Participants in the Affirmed group were given the chance to affirm themselves
by only focusing on self-affirming past behaviors, whereas participants in the
Deaffirmed group were urged to focus on the opposite. From the literature review, we
see that selective attention to self-affirming information is a self-deceptive technique
which could have been applied to the conditions in this study. While there was a small
effect between the Affirmed and Deaffirmed groups in this direction – Affirmed
participants rated others slightly higher than Deaffirmed participants – this difference
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was not statistically significant. The stronger model still appears to be the Double
Standard, or egocentric standardization.
A simple social comparison effect also seems to be ruled out. Participants could
relieve dissonance and reaffirm themselves by lowering their ratings of themselves, but
lowering their ratings of others more. This would allow them to believe that they were
still more likely than the average person to use condoms. However, this is not the case
either because the participants in this study didn’t change their ratings of themselves at
all, even though they did lower their ratings of others by a significant margin.
Not only was the current research successful in demonstrating a link between
Self-Deception and Cognitive Dissonance, in the process of developing a study capable
of demonstrating this connection, a method of measuring the actual performance of
dissonance reducing Self-Deception in the form of a double standard has been
suggested. While the Double Standards scale was specifically written in a format which
reflected past dissonance research using condom use as a framework, it might be
possible to apply this method in a variety of frameworks. As long as participants rate
themselves and others in the performance of a specific behavior, and that behavior is
susceptible to value judgments which are self-relevant, it should theoretically be
possible to repeat the effect demonstrated in the current work. That is, as long as the
method is truly measuring the performance of a double standard.
There were, however, some important limitations in the current work. The huge
drop-off of participants between the initial and experimental condition was massive.
This may have been due to the nature of the study – people might have been put off by
the prospect of coming into the lab to do a study about the use of condoms. Because of
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this, the sample in the experimental condition was very small. While statistical
significance was achieved in the predicted pattern, a larger sample may garner very
different results. Especially since the sample was not only small but extremely
demographically limited. Only white females participated in the second half, which may
indicate important differences between them and other groups. With a more diverse
sample, it is entirely possible that a different pattern altogether could emerge.
In the future, this highly significant research should be replicated with these
limitations in mind. Repackaging the Double Standards scale in a different behavioral
framework will test its ability as a method to detect the use of a double standard. This
change should also eliminate the complications caused by using condom related
behaviors as the basis for the study. Further research may develop the observed and
theoretical connection between dissonance and self-deception, as well as provide the
psychological research community with a powerful tool which measures the
performance of a behavior only before measures using personality trait surveys.
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Appendix A
Double Standards Self-Ratings
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Listed below are questions concerning your personal use of condoms. Please
provide a response for every question, concerning your likelihood to use condoms
in each of the following situations.
Just met your partner at a bar that night.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

6

Every Time

4

5

6

Every Time

4

5

6

Every Time

5

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

Just met your partner at a party that night.
Not Ever

1

2

3

You or your partner is on birth control.
Not Ever

1

2

3

You've been exclusive with your partner for a week.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

You've been exclusive with your partner for a month.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

You've been exclusive with your partner for 3 months.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

You've been exclusive with your partner for 6 months.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

You've been exclusive with your partner for 1 year +.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

Your partner insists that they don't have any diseases.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

6

Every Time

3

4

5

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

You or your partner is sterile.
Not Ever

1

2

Your partner tells you they don't want to use a condom.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

You or your partner thinks that wearing a condom could decrease performance.
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Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

6

Every Time

4

5

6

Every Time

Likelihood of using a condom in general.
Not Ever

1

2

3
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Appendix B
Double Standards Other-Ratings
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Listed below are questions concerning the average person’s use of condoms. Please
provide a response for every question, concerning their likelihood to use condoms
in each of the following situations.
Just met their partner at a bar that night.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

6

Every Time

4

5

6

Every Time

4

5

6

Every Time

5

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

Just met their partner at a party that night.
Not Ever

1

2

3

They or their partner is on birth control.
Not Ever

1

2

3

They've been exclusive with their partner for a week.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

They've been exclusive with their partner for a month.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

They've been exclusive with their partner for 3 months.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

They've been exclusive with their partner for 6 months.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

They've been exclusive with their partner for 1 year +.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

Their partner insists that they don't have any diseases.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

6

Every Time

3

4

5

6

Every Time

6

Every Time

They or their partner is sterile.
Not Ever

1

2

Their partner tells them that they don't want to use a condom.
Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

They or their partner thinks that wearing a condom could decrease performance.
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Not Ever

1

2

3

4

5

6

Every Time

4

5

6

Every Time

Likelihood of using a condom in general.
Not Ever

1

2

3
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Appendix C
Condom Use Information Sheet
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Consistent and correct use of the male latex condom reduces the risk of
sexually transmitted disease (STD) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
transmission. However, condom use cannot provide absolute protection against
any STD. The most reliable ways to avoid transmission of STDs are to abstain
from sexual activity, or to be in a long-term mutually monogamous relationship
with an uninfected partner. However, many infected persons may be unaware of
their infection because STDs often are asymptomatic and unrecognized.
Condom effectiveness for STD and HIV prevention has been demonstrated by
both laboratory and epidemiologic studies. Evidence of condom effectiveness is also
based on theoretical and empirical data regarding the transmission of different STDs,
the physical properties of condoms, and the anatomic coverage or protection provided
by condoms.
Laboratory studies have shown that latex condoms provide an effective barrier
against even the smallest STD pathogens.
Epidemiologic studies that compare rates of HIV infection between condom
users and nonusers who have HIV-infected sex partners demonstrate that consistent
condom use is highly effective in preventing transmission of HIV. Similarly,
epidemiologic studies have shown that condom use reduces the risk of many other
STDs. However, the exact magnitude of protection has been difficult to quantify
because of numerous methodological challenges inherent in studying private behaviors
that cannot be directly observed or measured.
Theoretical and empirical basis for protection: Condoms can be expected to
provide different levels of protection for various STDs, depending on differences in
how the diseases or infections are transmitted. Male condoms may not cover all infected
areas or areas that could become infected. Thus, they are likely to provide greater
protection against STDs that are transmitted only by genital fluids (STDs such as
gonorrhea, chlamydia, trichomoniasis, and HIV infection) than against infections that
are transmitted primarily by skin-to-skin contact, which may or may not infect areas
covered by a condom (STDs such as genital herpes, human papillomavirus [HPV]
infection, syphilis, and chancroid).
STDs, including HIV
HIV Infection
•

Consistent and correct use of latex condoms is highly effective in preventing
sexual transmission of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS.

Other STDs and Associated Conditions
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•

•

•

Consistent and correct use of latex condoms reduces the risk for many STDs that
are transmitted by genital fluids (STDs such as chlamydia, gonorrhea, and
trichomoniasis).
Consistent and correct use of latex condoms reduces the risk for genital ulcer
diseases, such as genital herpes, syphilis, and chancroid, only when the infected
area or site of potential exposure is protected.
Consistent and correct use of latex condoms may reduce the risk for genital
human papillomavirus (HPV) infection and HPV-associated diseases (e.g.,
genital warts and cervical cancer).

Consistent and Correct Condom Use
To achieve maximum protection by using condoms, they must be used consistently
and correctly.
The failure of condoms to protect against STD/HIV transmission usually results
from inconsistent or incorrect use, rather than product failure.
•

Inconsistent or nonuse can lead to STD acquisition because transmission can
occur with a single sex act with an infected partner.
Incorrect use diminishes the protective effect of condoms by leading to condom
breakage,

slippage, or leakage. Incorrect use more commonly entails a failure to use condoms
throughout the entire sex act, from start (of sexual contact) to finish (after
ejaculation).
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Appendix D
Affirmed Condition Essay
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Think back on times you have used condoms during sex. Consider all the details
surrounding the situation very carefully. When you have a clear memory of these times,
write down why you decided that using condoms was the best choice.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix E
Deaffirmed Condition Essay
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Think back on times you have not used condoms during sex. Consider all the
details surrounding the situation very carefully. When you have a clear memory of these
times, write down why you decided that not using condoms was the best choice.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix F
Figures
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Figure 1. Within Groups Differences.
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Figure 2. Between Groups Differences.
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